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On the basis of the empirical evidence concerning the role of emotions in moral 
judgments, new sentimentalist approaches to metaethics have been proposed. nichols’ 
theory of sentimental rules, in particular, associates the emphasis on emotive reactions to 
the relevance of a normative body of rules that guide our judgment on actions. according 
to nichols, the emotive mechanism of concern explains the acquisition of the moral 
capacity and, together with the evidence on psychopaths and autistic children, shows the 
implausibility of a) moral rationalism, both as a conceptual and as an empirical thesis; b) 
motivational internalism; and c) moral objectivism. however, if we distinguish between i) 
the initial acquisition of morality in children and ii) the adult experience of it, we can see 
that to accept a central role of the emotive mechanisms in the first is not to have shown 
their centrality in the second. in particular, it is not possible to account for the normative 
theory in purely emotive terms, even though we accept that their emotive connotation 
favours the evolutive success of the norms. a moderate rationalist view, grounded on the 
notion of reflective endorsement and on the cooperation between emotions and rational 
capacities seems quite compatible with the empirical evidence and can justify plausible 
forms of internalism and objectivism.
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recent research in moral psychology and on the neural bases of moral 
judgment has highlighted the relevance of automatic reactions of an 
emotive kind in human morality. this research has empirical character, i.e. 
it aims to provide a reliable description of how our moral capacity actually 
works; according to some, it also has normative relevance, that is, it suggests 
how we should (or should not) use our moral capacities as well (greene 
2003 and 2008; Singer 2005). To say that neuroscientific research has such a 
normative bearing is however highly controversial, as it seems to imply a 
problematic derivation of “ought” from “is”: and some commentators have 
rightly insisted that in order to reach any such normative conclusions we 
must always presuppose certain moral intuitions, while the neuroscientific 
results are in fact doing no real work in the argument (Berker 2009). 
it is much more plausible, however, to say that this research has some 
direct or indirect implication of a metaethical kind, that is, on our 
ideas concerning the nature of ethics. metaethical propositions are not 
prescriptive, but descriptive: they aim to explain what moral judgments are, 
and whether they can be said to have any kind of truth-value. according to 
several authors, research in moral psychology and neuroethics justifies a 
radical revision of our traditional image of the moral capacity: specifically, 
a criticism of rationalist views, according to which our moral judgments 
are essentially the work of reason, and a vindication of a sentimentalist 
approach, that considers them the expression of our sentiments and 
affective reactions. some explicitly say that there is empirical evidence 
for an emotivist conception of morality (haidt 2001), according to which 
moral judgment belongs to moral sense, that is, to “an innate preparedness 
to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events 
involving other human beings” (haidt and Joseph 2004,  56). 
although the data clearly do not show the truth of emotivism concerning 
the nature of moral language—that is, of the view holding that moral 
judgments have the logical function to express certain peculiar 
emotions (Joyce 2008)—they in fact seem to count as reasons in favor of 
a sentimentalist approach that, both from an explanatory and from an 
explicitly causal point of view, attributes a central role to emotive reactions 
and an altogether subsidiary role to rational reflection. In particular, 
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haidt’s social intuitionist conception aims to show that moral judgments 
are caused, in the great majority of cases, by the bursting in of certain 
emotions, while the arguments offered in their favor are almost always ex 
post rationalizations, that is, clumsy attempts to give reasons to support our 
automatic responses: these attempts are generated in the context of a social 
request of justification and have no causal or explanatory role in generating 
the judgments in the first place. 
this model seems to leave no space for altogether ordinary psychological 
processes, such as first-person solitary moral reflection and deliberation, 
and must consider all moral arguing as a lawyer’s attempt to defend a moral 
truth that is simply accepted a priori. moreover, it seems unable to account 
for the empirical fact that controlled “cognitive” processes are effective 
in (sometimes) contrasting the emotive responses, overwriting rational 
responses based on consequentialist computations (greene et al. 2001, 2004 
e 2008). in other words, by making reason a complete “slave of the passions”, 
this emotivist view is in contrast with the empirical evidence that suggested 
the “dual-process model”.
shaun nichols’ model of the sentimental rules offers a much more complex 
formulation of the neosentimentalist approach: it not only establishes the 
disposition to feel certain emotive reactions, particularly with reference 
to others’ sufferings, as the fundamental component of the moral capacity; 
it also stresses the importance of some normative perspective, that is, of a 
body of rules concerning the approval and disapproval of certain kinds of 
behavior (nichols 2002a, 2004, 2008). 
Building on the data from several psychological experiments, nichols argues 
for the following points: a) morality—and particularly the capacity to make 
core moral judgments (i.e., judgments that actions causing suffering to other 
people are wrong) and to distinguish between moral and conventional 
violations—is explained by the affective mechanism of concern; this accounts 
for the fact that three-year old children and autistic children are able to 
make core moral judgments while still lacking a developed theory of mind; 
b) the importance of this emotive mechanism, coupled with the empirical 
data concerning  psychopaths and people suffering from focal lesions of 
the ventromedial section of the prefrontal cortex, shows the implausibility 
of moral rationalism; c) the fact that psychopaths often display an intact 
capacity for moral judgment shows that knowledge of the sentimental rules 
can be dissociated from the emotive mechanism: moreover, subjects suffering 
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from focal lesions in the prefrontal cortex seem to be the living evidence 
of the theoretical possibility of amoralism (roskies 2003) and therefore 
show the fallacy of the conceptual internalism of the rationalistic view; d) 
the cultural fitness of emotively laden rules explains why certain rules do 
survive throughout human history and are largely accepted: this makes the 
objectivist explanation of moral “progress” offered by the rationalist view 
redundant. in other words, the partial and progressive overlap between moral 
codes can be explained by the similarity between our affective reactions; we 
simply happen to evolve such sentiments and there are no deeper moral facts 
that might vindicate moral objectivism. 
in what follows, i will suggest some reasons to believe that the very fact that 
nichols’ sentimentalist view is much more plausible and attractive than 
Haidt’s weakens his attack against moral rationalism, limiting its efficacy to 
radical or extreme forms of ethical rationalism. 
in order to assess nichols’ basic points, let us distinguish between i) the 
initial experience of morality which is found in children and which emerged 
phylogenetically at a certain point in the evolution of the species homo and 
ii) the much more complex experience of morality that is found in healthy 
adult humans. nichols’ research concentrates on level i): it aims to account 
for those basic judgments which he calls core moral judgments. a direct and 
easy way to defend moral rationalism would obviously be to deny that such 
judgments — that, according to many moral psychologists are found in 
three-year old children—are in fact authentic moral judgments.  We might 
say that the moral faculty presupposes a much larger mastery of moral 
concepts and of complex moral reasoning and that, therefore, the data from 
moral psychology do not undermine moral rationalism. however, nichols 
appropriately notes that children’s moral judgments resemble the adults’ 
ones in many ways; moreover, a considerable part of our daily normative 
experience is in fact based on those same mechanisms that are at work in 
core moral judgments. 
it seems sensible, then, to accept these judgments as integral to the moral 
capacity and to find in them the essential elements contributing to moral 
judgments in adults. nonetheless, the fact that core moral judgments 
depend on emotive reactions at level i) does not necessarily imply a 
sentimentalist explanation of level ii); that is, it does not demonstrate that 
emotive reactions to the others’ suffering are the decisive element of the 
moral capacity, as it is possessed by adults, or that all moral judgments 
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depend on the concern mechanism. in effect, although nichols considers 
highly implausible that the concern mechanism should have a merely 
evolutionary role, so that adult moral judgment could function in its total 
absence, he deems just as much dubious the “on-line hypothesis”, according 
to which the making of a moral judgment would always presuppose the 
activation of the affective mechanism: thanks to the normative theory, it 
seems very likely that adult moral judgments can often be made without any 
such activation.
thus, even accepting that the emotive mechanism of concern is essential for 
the starting of the moral faculty (nichols’ point a), we need to have a clearer 
view of the relationship between this mechanism and the normative theory 
in order to see whether the model of the sentimental rules can count as a 
refutation of moral rationalism (nichols’ point b). now, both elements seem 
necessary, according to nichols: the ability to feel certain emotive reactions 
is a necessary presupposition of the moral judgment—since individuals with 
congenital frontal lesions never acquire the moral capacity; but the emotive 
reactions are not in themselves sufficient to characterize morality and to 
distinguish it from other normative spheres. in fact, on the one hand, in 
cases of natural disasters, or of human interventions causing suffering with 
a view to larger benefits (for example, in the medical field), we can observe 
emotive reactions similar to those linked to core moral judgments, but 
no moral judgment is generated. on the other hand, nichols’ experiments 
themselves show that prohibitions relative to disgusting behaviour, which 
are reinforced by strong emotive reactions, acquire the same weight of 
moral prohibitions, even though common sense clearly distinguishes 
between the two kinds of prohibitions. (nichols 2002a). this suggests that 
the emotions are insufficient to distinguish the moral from the non moral 
sphere, and that the normative theory does not simply embody those 
emotive reactions. as a matter of fact, some non moral prohibitions relative 
to disgusting behaviour may be supported by negative emotions that are 
even stronger than those relative to some moral prohibitions, for example 
those tied to rules of justice and fairness in distribution, or those relative to 
promises: however, our normative theory considers the second as a clearly 
distinct kind of violation, and one much more serious than the first. 
it seems therefore highly plausible to say that the normative theory that 
structures our emotive reactions reflects a relevant work of rational reflection 
as well. it is not the case that our set of rules simply expresses our emotions; it 
also reflects the work of rational reflection, a work which can partially shape 
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our emotive reactions. This work manipulates specifically moral concepts—not 
only harm and physical suffering, but also injustice and unfairness, disrespect 
of others’ dignity, humiliation of others, and the like—and on the basis of 
these concepts attributes a particular degree of importance to specifically moral 
violations; the acknowledgment of the peculiar importance of moral violations, 
on its turn, generates new emotions and sentiments that were not involved in 
core moral judgments. the very fact that nichols’ theory attaches a relevant 
role to the normative theory, therefore, shows that sentimental reactions 
are insufficient in order to give a complete explanation of morality and of its 
distinction from other forms of normativity. if this is so, it is very likely that also 
in the initial acquisition of the moral capacity an essential role is played by the 
normative set of rules that enable to judge the appropriateness of feelings and 
actions; without the aid of the normative theory, children would never be able 
to distinguish between the moral from the non moral sphere, and would never 
learn the distinction between rules forbidding actions that are malicious or 
unfair and those forbidding actions that are simply disgusting. 
a possible sentimentalist rejoinder is to insist that the normative theory 
is itself the product of our emotive reactions: it is the emotive mechanism 
that accounts for the rules we have, and the normative theory is simply the 
systematization our sentimental responses. nichols himself proposes the 
“affective resonance hypothesis”, according to which the annexing of a rule into 
our normative system is considerably favoured by its cultural fitness, which 
in turn depends on our emotive reactions: that is, the more a rule is tied to a 
behaviour that in itself generates a remarkable emotive reaction, the more it 
is likely to be permanently adopted and handed down to future generations 
(2002b; 2004). however, we must note that the fact that being emotively 
reinforced favours the evolutionary success of a rule is quite compatible with 
the hypothesis that the normative theory is not a mere systematization of 
our spontaneous affective reactions. and nichols himself does not deny that 
rules can be preserved from one generation to the next, even though they are 
not emotively laden. he writes: “obviously there are other important factors in 
cultural evolution. the hypothesis is only that affective resonance will be one 
of the factors that influence cultural evolution” (Nichols 2008,  270). It is clear, 
therefore, that the normative system cannot be explained exhaustively in 
terms of emotive causes: in particular, it is very plausible to suggest that some 
of our rules can be explained with reference to the aims that they serve, their 
favouring social cohesion, or their being supported by reasons that can be 
widely shared. in other words, lacking any proof of the fact that all our rules are 
based on an emotive sanction, it is likely that some (implicit or explicit) rational 
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mechanism exists that, along with our emotive reactions, helps to account for 
our normative theory. It is this supplement of rational reflection that allows to 
distinguish between the moral rules and other rules, such as those relative to 
disgust, that are supported by emotive mechanisms as well. 
this shows that one of the factors explaining the adoption of the rules—
even of those rules that are in fact supported by the emotive mechanism 
of concern—may well be the acknowledgement of objective reasons for 
their adoption, e.g. reasons consisting in the desire to protect people from 
unnecessary suffering and the like. in this picture, the emotive perception 
of others’ suffering would merely favour and support the perception of 
these reasons: the reasons themselves, however, could not be reduced to the 
emotions, being rather their causes. the fact that we have the normative code 
that we have would thus partly be explained by a mechanism of reflective 
endorsement, in which several normative reasons—including those that are 
brought about by our automatic emotive responses—are reviewed in a process 
of rational deliberation. if this is so, the core moral judgments themselves 
are generated by emotions that have been shaped by the normative theory 
governing the process of education; and this normative theory carries the 
traces of a complex cultural process. moreover, it is clear that the moral 
experience of adult individuals decisively depends on a normative theory 
that is no longer simply received, but self-consciously accepted and critically 
discussed. at this level, moral judgments may be partially independent from 
the actual activation of emotive responses, as in fact they generally are: it is 
a datum of experience that many of our ordinary moral judgment are not 
associated to, nor in any way generated by, the on-line activation of moral 
emotions.  
the conclusion to be drawn is that, while nichols’ criticism seems to be 
effective against extreme rationalistic views, according to which reason 
provides a full explanation of morality, quite independently of emotive or 
sentimental reactions, it does not rule out more moderate rationalistic views. 
In fact, a) scientific evidence concerning the moral capacity of children and 
of psychopathic or “acquired sociopathic” individuals shows that some basic 
emotive capacity is a prerequisite of “the moral point of view”, which is partly 
defined by the capacity to be emotionally tuned in with what happens to 
other people; and b) the normative theory that defines which emotions to 
have and which not, seems to be partly shaped by our emotive reactions. this, 
however, is compatible with a view according to which morality is, at root, 
the space of reasons, and in many cases (though not in all) moral judgments 
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depend on some rational (and fallible) deliberation on the reasons that we 
have. more precisely, in young children’s core moral judgments the reference 
to reasons is implicit and indirect, since it is mediated by the normative 
theory, which, though represented internally, is not explicitly present to the 
consciousness of the judging individual. in adult individuals’ more complex 
judgments, on the other hand, there is almost always some direct reference 
to our reasons. in fact, according to nichols himself, an individual who lacked 
any normative theory would not make real moral judgments, but would 
limit herself to express her emotions, as if uttering an interjection. in other 
words, contrary to XXth century emotivists, Nichols’ neosentimentalism 
does not treat emotions as in any way part of the content of moral judgments; 
emotions simply “play a role in leading us to treat as distinctive certain 
violations, including many of those we consider “moral”, like violations of 
harming others” (nichols 2008,  263). this, however, is quite compatible with a 
rationalistic view according to which emotive reactions are primary sources 
of reasons to act, and moral judgments are the reflective endorsement of our 
best reasons, mediated by the normative theory. 
let us now move to nichols’ thesis c), that is, the objection to motivational 
internalism: this is the view according to which there is a conceptual link 
between accepting a moral judgment and having some motivation to act 
accordingly. nichols believes that empirical evidence on psychopaths shows 
the possibility to make moral judgments without acquiring the corresponding 
motivations in the least degree; however, it is far from obvious that the moral 
judgments of psychopaths should count as authentic. on this issue, nichols 
is happy to rely on the empirical evidence of general opinion: he simply 
says that most people do believe that these moral judgments are authentic 
(nichols 2002c e 2004). even though we should accept this conclusion, it could 
hardly count as a decisive refutation of rationalistic internalism: according 
to this view, in fact, it is a conceptual truth concerning moral judgments 
that they provide reasons for action, which in turn provide motivations to 
act, so far as we are rational (Korsgaard 1986; smith 2004 and 2008; Joyce 2008). 
and rationalistic internalism acknowledges the existence of many reasons 
that may restrict the motivational capacity of moral reasons: for one thing, 
weakness of the will, or the fact that, acknowledging the existence of a reason 
to do x, we acquire a motive to do it, but we are pulled by a stronger motive 
to do y; and other forms of practical irrationality, on account of which we 
fail to acknowledge the practical implications of what we sincerely declare 
to believe. doubtless, psychopathy is itself a motive inhibiting the normal 
functioning of practical rationality; as long as they constitute blatant 
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examples of irrationality, psychopaths cannot constitute an objection to the 
view that to accept a moral judgment and not to have any corresponding 
motivation is to be irrational, even if we should accept that their moral 
judgments are authentic. 
On the other hand, to affirm the authenticity of these judgments is scarcely 
plausible. the very fact, stressed by empirical research, that practical reason 
is not a cold calculation of means and ends, but a cooperative enterprise 
between emotive responses and reflective processes, shows that the moral 
judgments made by psychopathic individuals are not authentic. as a matter 
of fact, they do not adequately distinguish between conventional and moral 
norms and therefore, in contrast to three-year old children, do not possess 
the moral capacity, according to nichols’ criterion1: we might say that they 
but quote socially widespread moral beliefs and rules. these patients lack 
the mechanism of concern that helps understand the seriousness of moral 
violations and that motivates moral behaviour. in the standard terms of 
contemporary metaethical discussion, the moral judgments of psychopathic 
individuals are paradigmatic examples of an “inverted commas” use of 
moral language. in any case, the fact that psychopaths make real moral 
judgments might be an argument against “simple motivational internalism”, 
according to which moral judgment guarantees moral motivation, but not 
against the form of internalism peculiar to moral rationalism (Joyce 2008).
similar considerations can be offered with reference to patients with 
ventromedial lesions of the prefrontal cortex. since these patients do make 
moral judgments, but lack any motivation to act correspondingly, they 
have been considered concrete examples of amoralism and direct proofs 
of the falsity of motivational internalism. as noted by adina roskies, they 
are “walking counterexamples to this internalist thesis” (roskies 2003,  
51). again, how authentic these moral judgments can be, is a matter of 
discussion: and if they are, the fact that rational and emotive areas of their 
brain are unrelated justifies the conclusion that VM patients’ practical 
rationality is compromised; therefore, it is difficult to see how they could 
undermine the peculiar motivational internalism of the rationalistic view. 
on the other hand, it must also be stressed that there is a radical difference 
between making moral judgments in third and in first person: VM patients 
may be able to make “abstract” moral judgments from a spectator’s point 
of view, but are definitely unable to make first person moral judgments, 
1  of course, one could deny that the capacity to distinguish between the moral and the 
conventional is constitutive of the moral faculty, as suggested by roskies (2008). 
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since this would imply a commitment to act accordingly that they are 
unable to adopt. in this sense, although it may be incorrect to say that Vm 
patients who are able to reason abstractly on moral dilemmas in Kohlberg’s 
style make “inverted commas” moral judgments—for they seem seriously 
convinced of the truth of what they say—it is nonetheless incorrect to say 
that they make authentic moral judgments. to do this, they should have the 
capacity to decide in first person, that is, to assume the agent’s perspective 
and to understand that action x is what is required from me in these 
circumstances (Kennett and Fine 2008).
one last word on the issue of moral objectivism (nichols’ thesis d), or the 
idea that the sentimental rule approach and its story concerning the 
cultural fitness of emotively laden rules undermine moral objectivity. 
For one thing, it must noted that moral rationalism is committed to moral 
objectivism, but not necessarily to moral realism: for example, a rationalist 
view such as Greene’s or Singer’s affirms the necessity to reformulate our 
evolutionary-biased normative theory in a consequentialist shape to reach 
moral objectivity, but does not embrace moral realism, nor justify any belief 
in objective moral facts (singer 2005; greene 2003; greene 2008). 
on the other hand, we cannot exclude that emotions might point out moral 
facts: they might not be contingent evolutionary facts, but means to acquire 
knowledge of some independently existing moral reality. of course, the 
plausibility of this view depends on how such a “moral reality” is conceived: 
if to accept that there are moral facts is to say that, in each situations, there 
are objective moral reasons to act, to claim that the emotions we have are the 
“right” ones because they point out the moral facts is simply to claim that 
in the emotive reactions accompanying the consciousness of some other’s 
suffering or being treated unjustly, we have access to objective reasons to 
avoid that suffering or injustice: reasons, that is, that can be acknowledged 
and shared by everyone. Rational reflection can detect these reasons and 
decide whether to adopt them, that is, whether to transform them in maxims 
of action and possibly in general principles of our normative theory. this does 
not alter the fact that emotive reactions are major sources of such objective 
reasons that our reflection can sanction. 
In other words, the rationalistic view affirming the practical character of 
reason does not necessarily (nor generally) maintain that moral statements 
refer to purely objective facts, utterly independent of any emotion or 
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practical interest of the agent. it claims that they express the reasons 
for action that are highlighted both by our emotive reactions and by our 
rational reflection, while facing practical situations. Moral choice, therefore, 
expresses both our emotive and rational nature, namely, the embodied 
nature of our moral agency.
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